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Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for
one of your own country: for I am the Lord your God.1
INTRODUCTION

Nearly twenty years ago, when I started teaching as a young clinical
instructor in New York City, I learned that John Hart Ely would be visiting
the law school as a distinguished professor during the spring term.
Awestruck, I considered various gambits to engage Ely in debate-perhaps
a radical critique of Democracy and Distrust or a political indictment of
The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade.3 In time, I
chanced neither. Uncharacteristically timid, I steered clear of him, fearing
he would dismiss my interests in poverty law and clinical education as
inconsequential, even trivial.
Years later in Miami, whenever I recounted this story, Ely jocularly
upbraided me for dodging him. Naturally reticent, he seemed baffled when
junior faculty retreated from him out of academic trepidation. On more than
one occasion, he expressed disappointment that a young colleague here or
elsewhere had passed up an opportunity to join him in a class or to share a
hopeful draft of a manuscript. For Ely, junior faculty infused energy and
Vitality into the common academic enterprise of teaching law. Charmingly
cantankerous, he mentored scores of young faculty, soliciting their
participation in his work and supporting their own fledgling scholarship.
Soon after he joined the Miami faculty, on a late summer evening in
August, Ely rang me up on the telephone. In the first years of our
friendship, hearing from him always gave me a start. A former soldier in
the Military Police Corps, he had a way of rousting attention. Struck by the
lateness of the hour, I wondered aloud about the purpose of the call. Having
spent two months teaching summer school in Miami, I had traveled far
north for respite in New England. Ely had worked to track me down. He
wanted to talk about race. He worried that he had been misunderstood.
Earlier in the year, Ely and I had started trading ideas about race.
Struggling to integrate Critical Race Theory into my civil procedure,
professional responsibility, and clinical courses, 4 I had sought out his

1. Leviticus 24:22 (capitalization altered), quoted in JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL
GROUND 390 n. 199 (1996).
2. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).

3. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973).
4. For works that integrate Critical Race Theory into these courses, see DOROTHY A. BROWN,
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 40-97, 312-48 (2003); and Kevin

R. Johnson, Integrating Racial Justice into the Civil Procedure Survey Course, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 242 (2004).
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opinions on the standard accounts of race found in constitutional litigation
and procedure. More than once, I lamented the absence and distortion of
race in civil procedure and professional responsibility cases, textbooks, and
law review commentaries. Even clinical texts on the lawyering process, I
complained, tolerate stereotype and stigma in representation, to the
detriment of impoverished clients and their communities.
Ely confronted race squarely, I quickly realized, recognizing
representational and remedial complexities while maintaining deep
commitments to equality in law and society. Proud of his work in Gideon v.
Wainwright and his early service as a public defender, he encouraged me
to tackle race on both the civil and criminal sides of the lawyering process.
Moreover, he urged me to visit the egalitarian themes of his work on
judicial review in Democracy and Distrust.Those themes, he often pointed
out, informed his policy decisions as general counsel of the Department of
Transportation 6 and his actions as dean of Stanford Law School.7
Paradoxically, Ely's commitment to equality and his profound
egalitarian sensibility began to divide us during the summer, which
surprised me given our mutually held convictions and shared reformist
ambitions. To Ely, lawyering for the poor and the disenfranchised was
tightly fastened to race and equality. Indeed, the good lawyer was race
conscious (aware of racial motivation and committed to racially tailored
relief) and egalitarian minded (dedicated to fair access, assistance, and
opportunity in law and the legal system). For Ely, however, neither race
consciousness nor racial equality fully embraced race-based identity and
community.
To be sure, Ely understood racial identity and community. His analysis
of racial motivation in legislation turned on the character of white and black
identity. Likewise, the nature of racial community underlay his examination
of racial equality in voting. But I believe the import of racial identity and
community goes beyond substantive legislation and equality. In lawyering,
identity and community constitute dignity-based process values that derive
from fundamental notions of personhood and self-determination. These
values also serve an instrumental purpose of preserving or enlarging
cultural, social, and political standing. Claims of equal access, assistance,

5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. See William T. Coleman, Jr., John Hart Ely: Counselfor the Situation, 40 STAN. L. REV.
357, 357-60 (1988) (describing Ely's role as general counsel in race-based legal and policy
issues).
7. Ely's decanal record included both curricular and recruitment initiatives. To obtain greater
faculty diversity, for instance, he designated himself a member of the appointments committee,
irking some Stanford faculty members. See Jack H. Friedenthal, John Hart Ely: Dean of Stanford
Law School, 1982-1985, 40 STAN. L. REV. 370, 372-73 (1988).
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and opportunity that violate this integrity or undermine this purpose run
afoul of the central racial norms of the lawyering process.
Out of kindness, Ely never openly challenged this lawyering thesis,
though on many occasions he seemed to struggle with its overly broad
implications. Equality might not be sufficient, I might hear him say, but it is
a damn good start. Besides, he might add, the lawyer's job is to protect the
rights and liberties of the underdog. Let lawyers be lawyers! But Ely knew
that race is different and it is everywhere. It infects law, culture, and
society. It taints politics. It even contaminates the classroom. And so, many
summers ago, we unexpectedly debated racial identity and community not
only in law and lawyering but also in legal education, reflecting painfully
on Ely's experience at Stanford Law School. We guardedly quarreled over
the meaning and utility of race as an organizing principle for sociolegal
analysis and political action. Fueled by a peculiar mix of historical regret,
generational disagreement, and ideological divergence, that debate endured
even as our friendship strengthened, often to be revisited but never
resolved. Unsure that I appreciated the theoretical stakes and the practical
difficulties of fulfilling a commitment to racial equality, and worried that I
might judge him too harshly for hard choices he had made long ago as a
public defender, agency counsel, and dean, Ely declared plaintively that
night on the phone, "Now, I thought we were pretty good friends!"
This essay is about becoming friends with Ely's writing on race and
lawyering. Its purpose is to situate Ely within the advocacy traditions of
liberal legalism. Like Ely, liberal lawyering suffers from the tensions
wrought by a dual commitment to law and moral politics. Law heralds
process values, and its practice entails formal commitments to principles of
neutrality, objectivity, and reason. Moral politics, in contrast, honors
intrinsic norms and extrinsic results, and its performance involves
instrumental commitments to principles of partisanship, subjectivity, and
passion.
For four decades, Ely attempted to resolve the moral/formal tensions of
liberal legalism in constitutional theory and practice. Like other liberal
lawyers, he strove to balance formal commitments to legal process values
with moral and, indeed, political commitments to democratic access and
racial equality norms. Through the adversarial process, lawyers in the fields
of criminal justice and poverty law press for open access and equal
treatment on behalf of the poor and the accused. But by staying within the
constraints of that process in order to deliver access and equality to their
impoverished clients, these lawyers fail to appreciate the widespread
institutional subordination of the poor in law, culture, and society.
Neither Ely nor liberal lawyers grasp the importance of
antisubordination principles of representation, which prohibit demeaning
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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clients and damaging communities. Under antisubordination logic, nothing
is neutral in law, and nothing is natural or necessary in lawyering. By
focusing on identity, antisubordination principles affirm both subjectivity
and community in client representation. Their focal point is the social and
cultural identity of the client in the context of community.
From an antisubordination standpoint, the client is defined by his or her
identity, best understood as an amalgam of parts fused and fragmented by
class, gender, race, and more. This identity connects the. client to the fabric
of community through the intertwining strands of family, school, and
neighborhood. Any cultural or social stigma that damages identity harms
the dignity of the client and tarnishes the integrity or collective standing of
her community. Remedying that harm requires a mix of law and politics in
community action. Yet as this essay endeavors to show, community-based
legal action is a remedy too often out of the reach of liberal lawyers.
The essay is divided into four Parts. Part I describes the history of
Gideon v. Wainwright, documenting Clarence Earl Gideon's personal
background and the procedural contours of the litigation. It chronicles Ely's
participation and its continuing hold on his legal imagination.
Part II uses Gideon to uncover the jurisprudential roots of Ely's vision
of lawyering. It shows how Ely developed a legal process conception of
political access rights and minority equality rights through his writings on
civil rights, constitutional law, and criminal procedure. Moreover, it
explores how Ely's process vision was enlarged by the civil rights
movement and, at the same time, tempered by separation-of-powers
considerations of role competence, institutional function, and political
legitimacy.
Part III reexamines Gideon to expose the shortcomings of legal process
and client-centered lawyering models erected in defense of the
unrepresented. It demonstrates that these liberal-lawyering models of
representation in the fields of poverty law and criminal justice focus on
adversarial rights and material outcomes at the expense of democratic
empowerment and minority collaboration.
Part IV integrates Gideon into a broader discussion about clinical legal
education, criminal defense practice, and poverty law advocacy in
impoverished communities of color. It seeks to discern in Ely's work a core
set of democratic norms and narratives of political access and minority
equality generalizable to multicultural clients and communities. Further, it
sketches community-centered guidelines for lawyers laboring to advance
the legal, political, and economic interests of unrepresented individuals and
groups.
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I. GIDEONIN WHITE: RACE-NEUTRAL LAWYERING
I will not be proud of this biography, it will be no cause of pride;
nor will it be the absolute truth. I can not remember or desire to
remember that well.8
Ely got lucky in Gideon. He found his first client, Clarence Earl
Gideon, jailed and abject. Ely, then a second-year student at Yale Law
School, clerked during the summer of 1962 at Arnold, Fortas & Porter in
Washington, D.C. Gideon appeared to many as "the most wretched of
men." 9 He "bore the physical marks of a destitute life: a wrinkled,
prematurely aged face, a voice and hands that trembled, a frail body, white
hair."' 10 His destitution spanned a five-decade history of gambling and
imprisonment, including prior felony sentences for burglary and
drunkenness. 1' Although only fifty-one years old, he appeared "tossed aside
12
by life."
Born in 1910 to a "family of factory workers [sic] class" in Hannibal,
Missouri, Gideon described his early life as "miserable."' 3 At age fourteen,
he "ran away from home" to live "the life of a hobo and tramp."' 14 At age
fifteen, he was arrested for burglary and jailed in a juvenile "reformatory"
prison where he received whippings. He was paroled after a year, went to
15
work in a shoe factory, and married.
Unemployed at age eighteen, Gideon was convicted and sentenced to a
Missouri prison for robbery, burglary, and larceny. Released in January
1932, in the middle of the Depression, he was arrested for stealing
government property and sentenced to prison at Fort Leavenworth in
Kansas. Subsequently released in January 1937, he was arrested, convicted,
and sentenced to Missouri prisons three additional times, escaping twice
during a thirteen-year period. Released again in January 1950, he gambled,
16
married for a second time, and returned to prison.
In 1953, while working as a cook on a tugboat in Texas, Gideon
contracted tuberculosis and underwent surgery. In 1955, he bought a pool
hall in Texas and married for the third and fourth times in quick succession,
taking custody of his last wife's three children. Between 1956 and 1959, his
8. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 65 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Clarence Earl Gideon).

9. Id.at 6.
10. Id.at 5.
11. Id.at 5-7, 98.
12. Id.at 6.

13. Id.at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).

15. Id.at 67.
16. Id.at 67-68.
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wife gave birth to three more children. During this period, Gideon worked
as a guard, a watchman, and an automobile mechanic until he was arrested
and jailed for breaking and entering. The state welfare department
subsequently placed the children in foster care. From 1959 to 1961, Gideon
struggled to regain custody of his children while recovering from a second
round of tuberculosis-related hospitalization and laboring on a barge in
Louisiana. On June 3, 1961, he was arrested for17breaking and entering at the
Bay Harbor Poolroom in Panama City, Florida.
Ely apparently learned of Gideon's case following his 1961 jury trial
and conviction in county court for breaking and entering with the intent to
commit larceny. 18 Despite Gideon's opening plea for state assistance, the
trial judge denied his request for court-appointed counsel.' 9 Sentenced to a
maximum five-year term, Gideon declined to appeal his conviction and
instead petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus.
The state supreme court denied the petition, and in January 1962 Gideon
filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and a petition for a
writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.2 ° Written in pencil, the petition
urged the Supreme Court to review his state court plea for counsel. 2'
Gideon contended that "all citizens tried for a felony crime should have aid
of counsel. 2 His reply brief reiterated this contention, arguing "that a
citizen of the state of Florida cannot get a just and fair trial without the aid
of counsel. 23 Also in pencil, the brief observed, "It makes no difference
how old I am or what color I am or what church I belong too [sic] 24if any.
The question is I did not get a fair trial. The question is very simple.,
For two months during the summer of 1962, Ely labored to assist Abe
Fortas and Abe Krash, both partners at Arnold, Fortas & Porter, in

17. Id. at 68-76.
18. See id. at 9-10, 57-62 (detailing the trial).
19. Id. at 9-10. The trial transcript reflects the following colloquy:
The Defendant: Your Honor ... I request this Court to appoint counsel to
represent me in this trial.

The Court: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint counsel to represent you
in this case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the court can appoint
counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I
am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to appoint counsel to defend you in this
case.
The Defendant: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be
represented by counsel.
Id. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Id. at 3-8, 22, 62.
21. Id. at 4.
22. Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Id. at 37-38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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researching and preparing Gideon's Supreme Court brief.2 5 The brief relied
on a memorandum Ely prepared that summer, in which he painstakingly
examined Gideon's trial transcript for evidence of prejudice and judicial
error. Pointing to numerous errors and examples of prejudice, Ely asserted
that "it would seem that there is no trial in which counsel is unnecessary. 2 6
On March 18, 1963, the Gideon Court overruled Betts v. Brady,
reversing the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court and remanding the
case for further action.27 . Acknowledging Ely's premise that the trial
transcript showed that Gideon had "conducted his defense about as well as
could be expected from a layman,, 28 the Court nonetheless held that "in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
29
provided for him.,
Years later, Ely referred to the time spent in Washington helping Abe
Fortas write the Gideon brief as "the best summer job ever."30 But the
Gideon brief turned out to be more than a summer job. Both personally and
professionally, it reflected a galvanizing moment for Ely, which opened
academic and advocacy opportunities "to help follow up on the promise
that was made in Gideon.' 3 1 Looking back, Ely remarked, "I knew I was
foing to be a criminal defense lawyer, at least for a while .... ,32 Indeed,
soon after his graduation from Yale, Ely joined two other lawyers in
founding Defenders, Inc., a public defender office in San Diego,33
From 1966 to 1968, Ely served as a public defender representing
indigent defendants in federal and state criminal cases. During this period in
San Diego, Ely insisted, "the best defense came from the public
defenders." 34 Their mission, he explained, was to stand up for their clients'
welfare while minimizing damage. Closely tailored to individual client
contexts, the day-to-day arguments employed to advance this mission are
largely absent from Ely's writings. Typically self-effacing, Ely explained
this absence by discounting the content of his own advocacy. Instead he
stressed the importance of bearing witness in representation, remarking, "I
25. Id. at 120, 122-26. The final draft of the brief acknowledged Ely's "'valuable
assistance."' Id. at 138 (quoting petitioner's brief in Gideon).
26. Id. at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ELY, supra note 1, at 199.
27. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339, 345 (1963). Decided by a divided Court in
1942 under distressingly similar facts, Betts held that the Fourteenth Amendment was not
necessarily offended by a state's refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent felony defendant. Betts

v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
28. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336.
29. Id. at 344.
30. ELY, supra note 1, at 198.
31. Id. at 209.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 205.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

2005]

Gideon in White/Gideon in Black

1467

think it did my clients3 some
good to see me actually standing up and taking
5
them.
for
some shots
For Ely, the act of standing up in defense of the disadvantaged and the
underrepresented in the lawyering process was fundamental to liberal
legalism. Indeed, it defined the mission of liberal lawyers. Ely conceded,
however, that standing alone in a courthouse was insufficient. At Stanford,
for example, he supported the founding and eventual underwriting of the
East Palo Alto Community Law Project to provide student-directed legal
services to surrounding low-income neighborhoods.3 6 Likewise, he
supported clinical teaching of both trial and community advocacy skills,
albeit as a "mode of teaching" rather than an "ideological outlook. 37 More
broadly, he championed democratic commitments to political access and
minority equality rights in the interlocking forums of advocacy,
adjudication, and legislation.
Ely's evolution from trial advocate to community-based counsel
stemmed from his gradual and ultimately incomplete recognition that the
liberal-lawyering tradition of narrowly representing jailed and wretched
defendants fails to adequately address the racial subordination of the poor
and the accused. The liberal tradition of representation proffers claims of
fair access, equal justice, and effective assistance. These are the color-blind
claims of race-neutral lawyering. They are claims of reasonable access and
competent assistance-objective claims of Gideon in white. Their proffer,
however zealously made, overlooks the pervasiveness of racial
subordination and the centrality of racial identity for clients and
communities of color in law and lawyering. Gradually, Ely tried to enlarge
the legal process framework of liberal lawyering to take account of color.
II. GIDEON iN COLOR: RACE-CODED LAWYERING
I am a outcast.38
35. Id. at 210; see also id. at 431 n.8 ("The sight of an appointed lawyer actually fighting for
his client so shocked local juries that a number of them actually acquitted.").
36. See John Hart Ely, From the (Old) Dean, STAN. LAW., Spring 1987, at 3, 4; John Hart
Ely, Our Students: Do the Stereotypes Fit?, STAN. LAW., Fall 1984, at 2, 3 (endorsing
"[c]ombining a legal aid clinic with community education components"); see also Steven
Dinkelspel & Peggy Russell, The Making of a Community Law Project, STAN. LAW., Spring 1986,
at 8 (describing the development of the East Palo Alto Community Law Project). Without formal
faculty consultation, Ely committed $150,000 per year for a ten-year period to the project, a
decision that rankled some faculty. See Friedenthal, supranote 7, at 373.
37. John Hart Ely, Business Law vs. Public Interest Law: A False Dichotomy, STAN. LAW.,
Fall 1983, at 2, 3 (emphasis omitted); see also id. ("Skills learned clinically are transferable
skills."). Ely counted many clinical law teachers as allies and friends, among them Dennis Curtis,
Bill Hing, and Gerald L6pez.
38. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a letter from
Gideon to Fortas).
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At the outset of Gideon, Ely and the Arnold, Fortas & Porter defense
team imagined Gideon in color. Referring to Gideon, Fortas admitted, "I
specifically wanted to find out.., whether he was a Negro., 39 From a
litigation stance, that information might have proven useful in investigating
discriminatory practices by Florida police officers, prosecutors, and jurors,
or alternatively, in buttressing the claim of an equal protection violation, or
simply in evoking sympathy. But Ely and Fortas misapprehended the
meaning of "Negro" color. Well-trained liberal lawyers, they construed
color in customarily formal and instrumental terms.40 Lawyer formalism,
exemplified by the Scottsboro capital trial in Powell v. Alabama,4 1 defines
color in terms of black ignorance, feeble-mindedness, and illiteracy.4 2
Lawyer instrumentalism, displayed in Brown v. Board of Education,4 3
denotes color in terms of white pity.
Both formal and instrumental constructions of color under race-coded
lawyering demean black identity and damage black community. For
formalists, the colored client is incompetent and requires lawyer direction
rather than consultation and collaboration. For instrumentalists, the colored
client evokes historical sympathy and is a passive object of discrimination
rather than a moral subject capable of resistance.
Uncomfortable with the distortions of racial privilege implicit in
Fortas's remark, Ely resisted the demeaning classifications of race-coded
formalism and instrumentalism in favor of the term "underdog." In Ely's
view, liberal lawyers mounted legal and political battles on behalf of
underdogs like Clarence Gideon. Used frequently by Ely during our eightyear debate over lawyers and liberalism, the term underdog described for
him the powerless and the disenfranchised." In fact, the term described
Gideon exactly. For chroniclers of the case, Gideon himself "seem[ed] a
man whose own private hopes and fears ha[d] long since been deadened by
adversity-a used-up man, looking fifteen years older than his actual age of

39. Id. at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. See IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 138-46

(1996); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the NineteenthCentury South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 123-76 (1998); Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary
Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213,
1239-52 (1997).
41. 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN
SOUTH (rev. ed. 1979).
42. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 72 (evoking imagery of black deviance and inferiority through
depiction of the ignorance, feeble-mindedness, and illiteracy of the accused).
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. For the roots of our debate, see Anthony V. Alfieri, John HartEly: Fathersand Sons, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 953 (2004).
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fify-two. '45 His figure appeared "gaunt, a stooped six feet, one hundred

and forty pounds. 46 He spoke "in a slow, sad, defeated voice. 47
Ely recognized that underdog battles erupt daily in law, politics, and
society, often in impoverished communities of color and in the criminal
justice system. Waged by poverty lawyers and criminal defenders, the
battles highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the traditional liberal
conception of the advocate's role, function, and legitimacy. Our
longstanding debate over the competing strengths and weaknesses of liberal
lawyering is echoed in the current literature on clinical education, criminal
defense practice, and poverty law advocacy. Much of that literature shares
jurisprudential roots with the legal process movement. Legal process
scholars 48 endorse neutrality, institutional fidelity, and reasoned elaboration
in constitutional decisiomnaking. 49 They claim that these objective norms
confer wide legitimacy on the agents (administrators, lawyers, and judges)
and institutions (administrative agencies, courts, and legislatures) of liberal
50
legalism.
Yet legal process theories harbor mistaken objective judgments and
misplaced institutional fidelity. Further, their claims presuppose a stable
juridical universe free of race-motivated coercion. As Ely's friend Robert
Cover observed in the antebellum context of Fugitive Slave Law
enforcement proceedings, resisting such claims by "refus[ing] to abide the
results of the formal apparatus was a threat to the viability of that structure
and a direct assertion that the moral values of antislavery were of higher
priority than those underlying fidelity to legal process." 51
The liberal commitments of legal process engender moral/formal
dilemmas in adjudication and advocacy. The justification for traditional
advocacy tactics and strategies conforms to the adversarial process norms

45. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 96.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS

IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994); HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM (1953).

49. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule ofLaw" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997); Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles:A Retrospective, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 503 (1997); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561

(1988).
50. Legal process analysis continues across numerous fields. See Karen A. Jordan, The
Complete Preemption Dilemma: A Legal Process Perspective, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 927
(1996); Harold A. McDougall, Social Movements, Law, and Implementation: A Clinical
Dimension for the New Legal Process, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 83 (1989); Robert Weisberg, The
CalabresianJudicialArtist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983).
51. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 214

(1975).
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of partisanship and moral nonaccountability.5 2 Instead of promoting client
democratic access rights or commanding minority group equality rights, the
norms emphasize individual results obtained in isolation from politics,
culture, and society.
Rather than upend legal process norms, Ely set out to embolden them
with democratic access rights and minority equality principles, albeit within
separation-of-powers limits. Ely's legal embrace of political liberalism
involved both rights-based, representation-reinforcing principles (which
animate his democratic access and minority equality claims) 53 and role-

specific, institution-limiting principles (which inform his institutional
competence and legitimacy concerns).54
The notion of representation-reinforcing principles emerges from Ely's
celebrated theory of judicial review. For Ely, judicial review operates to
promote representative democracy by correcting malfunctions in the
political process. 55 Structural malfunctions occur when dominant groups

("the ins") block subordinate groups ("the outs") from obtaining access to
"channels of political change" or when legitimate representatives beholden
to a dominant majority group engage in practices that prove "systematically
disadvantaging" to subordinate minority groups "out of simple hostility or a
prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest., 56 Their corrosive
effect, according to Ely, denies subordinate minority groups equal
protection and, thus, a fair opportunity to participate in the political
process.57
Cast at the intersection of constitutional jurisprudence and democratic
political theory, Ely's conception of the affirmative, representationreinforcing function of judicial review is grounded in the values of political
access and minority inclusion.5 8 Fashioned from the text, structure, and
history of the Constitution, effective access rights fulfill the purpose of
safeguarding minority participation in the political process. In fact, the
Constitution itself facilitates this purpose, endowing courts with a
complementary performative role.
Designed to regulate the democratic process, Ely's "participationoriented, representation-reinforcing" theory of judicial review 59 not only
52. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 7, 50-66 (1988).

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See ELY, supra note 2, at 87-104.
See id. at 43-72.
See id. at 102-03.
Id. at 103.
See id.

58. Ely's search for constitutional values pervades his work. See John Hart Ely, Flag
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in FirstAmendment
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482 (1975); John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 TermForeword: On DiscoveringFundamentalValues, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978).
59. ELY, supra note 2, at 87.
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safeguards the minority participation rights of the disenfranchised and the
powerless but also preserves the integrity of the political process from
majority corruption. Ely condemned multifarious state policies and
practices that threatened minority electoral participation through voter
eligibility restrictions and voting district gerrymandering. 60 Alert to
pernicious stereotypes 6' and group harm, 62 he urged representationreinforcing rights principles tailored to shelter democratic institutions and
procedures.6 3
Ely's passion for preserving democratic safeguards is traceable to the
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s and his experience as a
Warren clerk and public defender, which stirred him to recognize the
consequences of inequality in law, politics, and society. Indeed, inequality
served as the springboard for much of our decade-long lawyering
conversation about voting rights, poverty law, and affirmative action. His
amicus brief in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., for example,
demonstrates a broad commitment to equal treatment and affirmative
relief.64 Despite its legacy of white resistance and violence, the civil rights
movement exemplified for Ely the importance of representation-reinforcing
advocacy and interracial collaboration in the fight for equality.
Ely defined equality primarily in terms of access and treatment. He
advocated open access and evenhanded treatment for minorities in civil as
well as criminal justice systems. When he discovered impediments to
economic access or incidents of unequal opportunity, Ely searched out
65
evidence of unlawful racial motivation and unwarranted discrimination.
He denounced racially motivated discrimination in publicly regulated areas,
such as school systems.66 Likewise, he supported state enactment and

60. See John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes Now Acceptable
Across the Board or Only When Used in Support of PartisanGerrymanders?, 56 U. MIAMI. L.
REV. 489 (2002); John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 607 (1998); John Hart Ely, Standing To ChallengePro-Minority Gerrymanders,111 HARV.
L. REV. 576 (1997).
61. Ely's race-conscious approach continues to influence voting rights scholarship. See, e.g.,
John 0. Calmore, Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New Demography in a Multiracing
America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1257-73 (2001); Walter C. Farrell, Jr. & James H. Johnson, Jr.,
Minority Political Participationin the New Millennium: The New Demographics and the Voting
Rights Act, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1215, 1237-42 (2001); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and
Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 631-45 (2002).
62. See John Hart Ely, If at First You Don't Succeed, Ignore the Question Next Time? Group
Harm in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 215 (1998).
63. See John Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-ReinforcingMode of Judicial Review,
37 MD. L. REV. 451 (1978).
64. BriefAmicus Curiae ofACLU et al., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) (No. 87-998).
65. See ELY, supra note 1, at 247-78; John Hart Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial
Discrimination,41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974).
66. See ELY, supra note 1, at 254-61.
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enforcement of antidiscrimination laws in private market transactions, such
as in housing,67 and understood that procedural due process values proved
vital to administrative fairness, as in disability and welfare hearings.
Moreover, Ely recognized that equal justice in criminal law required
equal access to counsel and equality of treatment.6 8 Like many defenders
today, 69 Ely defined access to counsel in terms of effective representation.
He demanded equitable treatment of the accused in police targeting and
prosecutorial charging as well as in the conduct of trial and sentencing.
Skeptical of race-infected trial strategy7 ° and cognizant of the constitutional
mission of criminal defenders, 71 he insisted on the fair treatment and
zealous representation of criminal defendants both to avert discrimination
and to preserve liberty. To Ely, liberty carved a pathway to democratic
participation coextensive with dignity. That pathway, however, was
narrowed by separation-of-powers limits.
Reasoning from settled traditions of democratic governance, Ely
deduced process limits from principles of institutional function, power, and
legitimacy.7 2 To Ely, the agents and institutions of democratic governance
in adjudication, legislation, and regulation carried discrete functions and
implementing powers.73 Their political legitimacy depended on the proper

67. See id. at 275-78.
68. See id. at 211-32 (critiquing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
69. See William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 92-97 (1995); Bruce A.
Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433,
433 (1993); Note, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062 (2000).
70. See John Hart Ely, Op-Ed, Murder Trials and Other Spectator Sports, MIAMI HERALD,
June 8, 1997, at LI; see also Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ingan Ethic of Justice, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 935 (1999); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1996).
71. See generally Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175
(1983) (examining traditional justifications of criminal defense practice); David Luban, Are
Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993) (testing the legitimacy of the
ideology of aggressive advocacy in criminal defense practice).
72. The 1960s antiwar movement pushed Ely to critically examine both congressional and
presidential war powers. Initially prompted by objections to the Vietnam War, Ely's study of
congressional and presidential war powers gradually expanded to include wider conflicts in
Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. His writings signal an abiding concern for
democratic governance and responsibility in times of war. Equally noteworthy, they reveal
growing apprehension about the institutional limits of the Supreme Court's role as a bulwark
against the unchecked exercise of executive and legislative powers. See ELY, supra note 1, at 14351; JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND

ITS AFTERMATH 105-14 (1993).
73. See generally John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice
in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833 (1991)
(advocating a judicial role in prodding Congress to perform its constitutionally contemplated
policymaking functions to counterbalance presidential power); John Hart Ely, The Apparent
Inevitability of Mixed Government, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 283 (1999) (assailing dominant
academic theories of judicial review for permitting judges to evaluate the wisdom of legislative
choices).
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discharge of those functions and the reasoned exercise of delegated powers.
Legitimacy failed when institutions abandoned their functions, exceeded
their roles, or abused their powers.74 In a searing constitutional analysis, Ely
documented this abandonment and abuse, and the concomitant loss of
political legitimacy, in the American prosecution of the Vietnam War.75
Ely's constitutional commitments to racial equality, institutional
function, and political legitimacy were tested by his experience as
general counsel at the Department of Transportation. As before, the
commitments engendered institutional tensions and strained efforts to
reconcile competing remedial values. Recalling that experience, former
Secretary of Transportation William Coleman explained that when
President Ford's cabinet debated the remedial policy of school busing in
school desegregation cases, Ely "seized on busing as a transportation
issue. 76 Coleman wrote that, for Ely, school busing served as "an essential
tool in redressing the wrongs perpetrated by school segregation. '' 77 Both Ely
and Coleman surely realized that the Department of Transportation's
endorsement of busing as a means of redress brought the norms of equality,
function, and legitimacy into sharp conflict inside and outside the Ford
Cabinet. Coleman noted that Ely "felt so strongly about the civil rights
policies at stake that he submitted... , with no threat of publicity, a letter
of resignation that would be effective if the President were to side with
busing opponents. ' 78
Ely's preference for an act of private conscience over a moment of
public protest is unsurprising given his constitutional temperament and
natural disposition. This is not to say that Ely held the norms of institutional
function and political legitimacy inviolate. To the contrary. For Ely, neither
institutional function nor political legitimacy trumped equality. The moral
character of his constitutional commitments precluded the easy
subordination of equality to higher structural values. At the same time, as
Ely demonstrated in Gideon and in his public defender practice, the
balancing of constitutional commitments to individuals and institutions
inevitably shapes both the form and substance of equality-based advocacy,
including the role of community organization and political action in the
lawyering process. In this way, Ely's federal regulatory experience at the
74. See Ely, supra note 3, at 922-26.
75. See ELY, supra note 72, at 12-46. See generally John Hart Ely, The American War in
Indochina, Part P The (Troubled) Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 877 (1990) (urging congressional adoption of a bright-line test of war powers authorization);
John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1379 (1988) (proposing amendment of accountability-enhancing provisions of the War Powers
Resolution of 1973).
76. Coleman, supra note 6, at 358.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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Department of Transportation intensified his struggle to differentiate
political and legal forms of permissible advocacy, especially in racially
inflammatory policy contexts.
Grafting Ely's separation-of-powers principles onto the lawyering
process may strike some as attenuated. Yet founded on the structural logic
of institutional role, function, and legitimacy, the principles apply with
equal force to advocacy. Engrained in that logic is a deep-seated notion of
constraint on roles. To his credit, Ely rejected the notion of a fixed or rigid
sense of constraint. His concept of constraint resembled a field of channeled
discretion that afforded institutional agents-lawyers, judges, and
administrators-room to maneuver in the exercise of advocacy,
adjudication, and regulation.
The notions of constrained juridical roles and relationships, limited
institutional competencies and functions, and contingent claims to political
legitimacy correspond with a conventional understanding of liberal
lawyering. Most poverty lawyers and criminal defenders view the
lawyering process as constrained by the roles and relationships of adversary
and administrative systems. Those systems assign identities and allocate
functions. The performance of lawyer identity and function occurs through
narrative embodied in symbolic, written, and social texts, which brings
logic and order to the lawyering process. Absent from this logic of
lawyering and its natural or necessary order is a collaborative or
participatory ethic or narrative.
Ely's separation-of-powers principles link lawyer ethics and narratives
to institutional competence and political legitimacy, channeling the
lawyering process toward constricted adversarial roles and relationships.
Unfortunately, this consigns democratic access and minority equality
considerations to political and social spheres outside law. Both poverty law
and criminal justice thus narrow the range of lawyer competence and
tighten the ambit of lawyer institutional function in the interests of political
legitimacy. This obscures the vision of Gideon in black.

III. GIDEON iN BLACK: RACE-CONSCIOUS LAWYERING
I have no illusions about law and courts or the people who are
involved in them.79
It seems likely that neither Ely nor the Arnold, Fortas & Porter defense
team saw Gideon in black. They saw no identity and no community. They
saw no power and no useful class or culture. They saw no sign of moral

79. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 78 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gideon).
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agency and no opportunity for political mobilization. Trapped in the legal
process prism of liberal lawyering, they saw only wretchedness.
Too white for race-ing, Gideon offered a color-blind slate to inscribe a
neutral claim for an objective measure of effective assistance in criminal
cases. Beyond pity, his identity bore little consequence to the litigation, and
his historical community of "factory workers" gained little recompense.
Gauged by its progress in affirming the subjective dignity of client identity
or in combating Southern class-based deprivation, the Gideon litigation
accomplished less than its reformist efforts promised. To imagine Gideon in
black is to see him in the fullness of social and cultural identity and to
situate his case in its broader legal-political context. For poverty lawyers
and criminal defenders schooled in the color-blind traditions of clinical
education, client-centered representation paradoxically blunts that vision.
A. Poverty Lawyers
The notion of client-centered representation dominates clinical legal
education in both poverty law and criminal justice. 80 This method of
representation typically constructs stereotypical identities for the lawyer
and the client based on generalized traits. 81 The lawyer's identity is
characterized by the loyal, zealous advocacy of partisanship and the bestinterest calculations of paternalism. The client's identity, by contrast, is
viewed simply as an instrument of partisanship and an object of paternalism
to be exploited in pursuit of material goals. These identity constructions are
widespread and occur throughout law offices, jails, and courtrooms.82
Social construction of this sort hinges on the multiple categories of client
identity, including class, ethnicity, gender, and race. Lawyer constructions
of client identity are embodied in trial narratives heard in opening
statements and closing arguments.
Too often unmindful of these identity constructions in advocacy,
clinical teachers describe the lawyering process as a bundle of objective
technical skills that can be applied across interviewing, counseling, and trial
advocacy. Ely, for example, alluded to clinically "learned" skills as
"transferable" and nonideological.83 But the notion that there exists a

80. By clinical education, I mean extemship, live-client, and simulation (pretrial, trial, and
appellate) programs.
81. See Ann Shalleck, Constructionsof the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV.

1731 (1993).
82. See William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: NegotiatingReality and
Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1459-66 (1992); Austin
Sarat, ".... The Law Is All Over": Power,Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare
Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990).
83. Ely, supra note 37, at 3.

Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

1476

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 114: 1459

generalizable lawyer technique capable of universal application overlooks
the diverse configurations of client identity. In the Gideon brief, for
example, we never hear of Gideon's struggle to regain custody of his
children from the Florida foster care system 84 or of his religious faith.85
The failure to recognize diverse client identities has a number of
consequences. As my discussion in Part II articulates, there are inherent
tensions between process considerations of role, function, and legitimacy
and axioms of democratic politics and rights mobilization, tensions that are
evident in client-centered representation of the indigent.86
Those who advocate the traditional client-centered process defend its
methods as driven by the demands of the adversary system. Clinical
teachers and lawyers frequently assert that these techniques are neutral and
objective. In. fact, such techniques often depend on construing client
identity in terms of dependence or deviance, character traits commonly
associated with historically subordinated groups, such as Gideon's class of
impoverished factory workers. Gideon exhibited signs of both dependence
and deviance. His illness and the abandonment of his children showed him
to be dependent on the largesse of the state, and his history of drunkenness,
gambling, and imprisonment showed him to be prone to deviance.
Construing clients like Gideon as dependent or deviant implies that
they are incapable of collaborative legal advocacy and political organizing.
As a result of this overbroad implication, clients appear incompetent, their
families dysfunctional, and their communities chaotic. This corrosive
character assignment occurs continuously, initially during the interviewing
and counseling process when lawyers first name clients-here in the guise
of drunkenness and wretchedness-and subsequently during trial and on
appeal.
Naming is an act of interpretive authority and translation that comes
instinctively to lawyers through pre-understanding. This act marginalizes
clients by presupposing their inferiority and then by suppressing alternative
client identities and excluding competing client narratives. Client

84. Gideon asserted, "I do not intend to let anyone take my children away from me and I will
fight it ever [sic] way I know how. I hope to be able to get my children into a home someplace
somehow, until I am able to take care of them myself." LEWIS, supra note 8, at 77 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
85. Gideon explained, "I do not like the idea of forcing my children are [sic] enticing them to
believe in any certain religion but I have always wanted them to learn the moral respect that the
people of this country has and of all the great religions I have pick the christian religion because it
is based on love." Id. at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. This account amplifies my earlier critiques of poverty-law-practice traditions. See
Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659 (1987-1988); Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients,
Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty
Law Practice:LearningLessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).
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subordination and discipline of this kind operates through the basic
conventions of the lawyering process, such as interviewing and fact
investigation. That process silences opposition, excludes options, and
compels obedience to the narratives of lawyer-decreed story and the tactics
of lawyer-designed strategy. Disciplinary conventions create the
expectation of client acquiescence to lawyer storytelling and litigation
strategy as the product of rational choice and self-interest. Gideon's
acquiescence to the Arnold, Fortas & Porter briefing strategy, for example,
confirmed the litigation team's expectation that he had nothing to offer-no
insight, no history, and no power to speak.
The marginalization of the client's role in poverty law practice also
occurs when lawyers use victimization strategies to present their client in a
sympathetic light. Poverty lawyers rationalize these victimization strategies
with the ideals of benevolence and paternalism, and they disavow any
implied devaluation of client capacity or competence. They insist on an
intrinsic state of dependence or a necessary portrait of helplessness drawn
to conform to the expectations of administrative decisionmakers and
adjudicators. Yet such victimization strategies reproduce narratives of
dependence and incompetence.
In poverty law, victimization strategies are prevalent in both directservice and law reform advocacy. The direct-service tradition treats poor
clients as isolated and passive individuals, which undercuts the common
experiences of impoverishment in areas such as education, health care, and
housing. Disaggregating these common experiences into discrete disputes
unrelated to larger classwide continuities inhibits the politicization and
mobilization of client communities. The routinization of cases into
formulaic practice patterns also encourages the disaggregation of disputes.
Driven by rising poverty rates, marginalizing traditions, and the
institutional economics of escalating caseloads and inadequate resources,
case routinization and standardization stunt client and community
empowerment. The slotting of cases and the shunning of community
mobilization find only modest relief in law reform advocacy.
Law reform advocacy also fails to break free of the constraints of the
hierarchical lawyer-client relationship. The law reform tradition, embodied
by test case and institutional reform litigation, attacks the laws and
institutional policies undergirding poverty. However, such advocacy stifles
the indigenous growth of grass-roots community leadership by centralizing
case design and decisionmaking authority in lawyers' hands. The tradition
also hinders grass-roots organizing campaigns by focusing energies on the
judicial branch instead of the executive and legislative branches. Although
law reform initiatives may activate political consciousness, their reliance on
dependent constructions of client identity and their adherence to the
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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hierarchical organization of lawyer-client divisions of labor reinforce the
constraints of role, function, and legitimacy instilled by the legal process
tradition.
Viewing clients and their communities as powerless demeans them and
distorts social reality, 87 yet this presumption pervades clinical education,
poverty law, and criminal defense practice. Practitioners in each field deny
the imputation of dependent or deviant infirmities, instead citing either a
natural client character or the instrumental necessity of proffering evidence
of such character to curry sympathy.
The denial of dignity in client-centered representation damages the
identity of the client subject and thereby inhibits the democratic politics of
civic association and political mobilization. Clients and communities draw
power from the internal resources of individuals and groups rather than
from the external interventions of lawyers. The frequent absence in
advocacy of narratives of local power drawn from individual and collective
action signals the abandonment of interpretive struggle over the alternative
depiction of client and community dependency in lawyer storytelling and in
lawyer-client roles, tactics, and strategies. Fundamental to that alternative
depiction is resistance. The same struggle over client identity and
community power occurs in the field of criminal justice.
B. CriminalDefenders
The representation of accused clients like Gideon in the criminal justice
system further exposes the tensions between process considerations and
rights mobilization. Both clinical and criminal defender traditions ignore
the extent to which legal process conventions harmfully construct clientcommunity identity and cultural meaning in criminal cases. 88 Legal process
norms urge the race-neutral representation of accused clients. Consistent
with adversarial commitments, race-neutral representation imbues the
defense function with the moral obligation to shield the accused from state-

87. For discussions of essentialist presumptions of gender and race in law, culture, and
society,

see generally

ELIZABETH

V.

SPELMAN,

INESSENTIAL

WOMAN:

PROBLEMS

OF

EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); and Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
88. This account augments my earlier critiques of criminal defender traditions. See Anthony
V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1293 (1998). For criticism, see Robin D.
Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the Road Less Traveled,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 788, 788-91 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Race-Based Defenses-The
Insights of Traditional Analysis, 54 ARK. L. REV. 739, 739-49 (2002); and Abbe Smith,
Burdening the Least of Us: "Race-Conscious" Ethics in CriminalDefense, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1585,
1585-91 (1999).
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inflicted violence whether she is guilty or innocent. The historical inequity
and rationing of state defense resources relative to prosecutorial powers and
assets further encourages indigent defender systems to embrace partisan
zeal in advocacy and plea bargaining, as displayed in Gideon and during
Ely's short-lived career at Defenders, Inc.
This elevation of liberty interests under the mandate of effective
representation jeopardizes a defendant's dignitary and community interests.
Dignitary interests become dangerously entangled in defense representation
when the cultural artifacts of caste and color as well as the social norms of
character and community come into play. The artifacts and norms combine
discursively in legal narratives. This defender-guided process translates
social meaning into law and extracts social meaning out of law.
Functionally, defenders occupy the role of interpretive agents engaged in
the construction of race and legal violence. 89
Criminal trials provide a forum for identity construction and the
sociolegal translation of violence. The trials shape identity and mold
narrative. The mutability of identity and the plasticity of narrative coincide
with several variables encompassing procedural and substantive laws,
judges and juries, and defendants and victims. Although prone to alterations
in cultural and social meaning, the variables establish a stable context for
the construction of identity and the translation of narrative. That stability
rests on stereotype.
Historical stereotypes of caste and color situate the racial status of the
accused and the accuser in law, culture, and society. Defenders cull such
stereotypes to mount color-coded defenses in their pretrial tactics (venue
transfer) and trial strategies (jury selection). Normative degradation
circulates throughout the defender discourses of constitutional, statutory,
and common law innocence and excuse. Directly and inferentially, those
discourses naturalize color-coded stereotypes of racial inferiority.
For example, in cases of black-on-white violence, the subordinating
narratives of color-coded stereotypes construct the identity of black males
in the antebellum terms of bestial pathology. This image of the black male
sociopath creates an objective impression of cognitive, volitional, and
moral incapacity. By contrast, in cases of white-on-black violence,
subordinating narratives restate black racial inferiority through the defender
tactics of jury nullification, victim denigration, and diminished capacity.
Jury nullification reflects the racial supremacy of white jurors urged to
override evidence of white offender responsibility for black victim harm in
89. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nornos and
Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J.
1601 (1986); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition,

94 COLUM. L. REv. 1721 (1994) (book review).
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crimes of racial violence. Victim denigration reproduces racial status
hierarchy by proclaiming narratives of black deviance and devaluation.
Diminished capacity reiterates hierarchy by declaiming the exculpatory
narrative of distraught white innocence, thereby absolving white
lawbreakers of moral and criminal culpability.90
Antisubordination principles offer remedial regulation of racialized
criminal defense practices. Advancing beyond Ely-derived norms of
political access and minority equality, these principles suggest a raceconscious, community-regarding ethic of political empowerment and
minority collaboration. This alternative ethic challenges the necessity of
inflicting racial harm that disfigures the character of individual defendants
and tarnishes the integrity of their victims and communities. A strong
version of this ethic requires criminal defense lawyers to renounce
unilaterally the deployment of deviance-based, racialized strategies. A weak
version encourages lawyer-client dialogue about the contested meaning of
racial identity and collective political harm risked by racialized defense
strategies. Departing from conventions of liberal lawyering, both remedial
prescriptions recognize the danger of identity harm to dignitary and
community interests. Moreover, both abandon the public/private distinction
in evaluating the political consequences of such stigma harm.
The ethic of race-conscious political empowerment and minority
collaboration transforms the legal process regime dominating criminal
defense practice. Institutionally rooted, that traditional regime depends on a
fixed, rigid conception of lawyer role, function, and legitimacy. But the
lawyer-client relationship also contains background regulatory norms such
as consensus and reciprocity, which furnish opportunities for moral and
political dialogue in advocacy. Converting criminal defenders into political
advocates entails race-conscious dialogue with clients and communities in
jointly opposing racial violence.
Daily opposition organized in local contexts brings empathy and
solidarity to the criminal defense process by encouraging a sense of client
belonging and group membership through shared norms and narratives. In
90. Defenders tolerate color-coded criminal defense narratives of black-on-white and whiteon-black violence concurrent with legal process theories of liberal agency. Liberalism posits the
defendant-client as a subjective moral agent capable of assenting to racialized narratives depicting
a naturally or necessarily defective black or white moral character. Under the contractarian
account of moral agency, client assent demonstrates the rational and voluntary logic of liberal
individualism. Under a communitarian account of agency, assent results from deliberative
dialogue weighing client, public, and third-party interests. Contingent on assent, both accounts
condone the deformity of defendant-client, victim, and community identity constructions through
self-abasing racial narrative. Defender tolerance of client self-abasement is masked by the legal
process rhetoric of color-blind neutrality and by the partition of the public/private spheres of
society and law. For defender adherents of legal process, that separation prevents the legal
desecration of racial identity from contaminating culture, society, or politics.
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the mixed context of race, poverty, and crime, community lawyers must be
responsive to individual identity, group self-determination, and interracial
reconciliation and strongly committed to empowerment and collaboration
norms. The norms of democratic citizenship push for inclusive deliberative
dialogue that garners consent from, and grants legitimacy to, rebellious
forms of legal-political organization. Antisubordination principles connect
individual civic identity and self-realization to collective political identity
and democratic citizenship. The principles posit in clients and communities
the capacity for moral decisionmaking and self-direction in law, politics,
and society. Sensitive to the complications of difference, they outline
community-based advocacy practices that may seize on the memory of
race-conscious collective action and unity. With these commitments,
lawyers can help build a model of collaborative lawyering that represents
Gideon in community.
IV. GIDEONIN COMMUNITY: COLLABORATIVE LAWYERING
I am not proud of this biography. I hope that it may help you in
preparing this case, I am sorry I could not write better I have done
the best I could.91
Locating Gideon in class-based community builds on Ely's core set of
democratic norms and narratives of political access and equality sufficient
to advance the legal, political, and economic interests of unrepresented
individuals and groups. Further, it discerns opportunities for democratic
empowerment and minority collaboration in the ordinary routines of
criminal defense and poverty law practice. Implemented alone or in tandem,
client-centered and community-centered models present complementary
strategies of client empowerment and community mobilization.
Ely's devotion to democratic empowerment provides poverty lawyers
and criminal defenders with a valuable starting point for an integrated
strategy of advocacy and organizing. But in order to transform traditional
client victimization practices, we will have to experiment with advocacy
roles and relationships, as well as our notions of lawyer-client roles,
identities, and narratives. At Stanford, Ely's support for community-based
of open-ended
clinical initiatives
demonstrated the promise
experimentation.
Rising in part out of the emergence of the National Welfare Rights
Organization and the Poor People's Campaign of 1968,92 community-based
91. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 78 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gideon).
92. For helpful accounts of the welfare rights movement, see MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL
NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 40-132 (1993); LARRY
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initiatives attempted to join legal rights advocacy 93 and local neighborhood
political action. 94 Although thwarted by inadequate resources 95 and ongoing
political harassment, 96 these initiatives continue the crucial fusion of legalpolitical strategies and advocacy-organizing tactics in fostering democratic
accountability and participation. As Ely's decanal stewardship of Stanford
Law School's East Palo Alto Community Law Project showed, the lawyerfacilitated participation of indigent clients in the legal-political process
engenders grass-roots leadership and popular resistance through rights
education and outreach.
Ely's defense of democracy-inspired community outreach shaped his
dedication to minority equality rights. The defense of democratic roles and
functions affirms client competence and independence. Moreover,
democratic identities and narratives support powerful oppositional voices of
community and solidarity and promote political participation and selfdetermination.9 7 Political rights promotion also inspires collective client
action and dilutes lawyer authority.
The subversion of lawyer privilege requires contextualized, experiential
reasoning oriented toward social justice, and this relies on lawyer-client and
client-community collaboration. 98 Collaboration in client-centered and
community-centered representation helps mitigate the continuing lawyering
tensions between institutional role, functional competence, and legitimacy

R. JACKSON & WILLIAM A. JOHNSON, PROTEST BY THE POOR: THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK CITY 31-66 (1974); and FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A.
CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 264-361
(1977).
93. See JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF
LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS:
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974); Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the

"Myth of Rights" in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice,8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469 (1999).
94. See HARRY P. STUMPF, COMMUNITY POLITICS AND LEGAL SERVICES: THE OTHER SIDE

OF THE LAW (1975); Harry P. Stumpf, Law and Poverty: A PoliticalPerspective, 1968 WIS. L.
REV. 694.
95. See JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 180 (1982).

96. See Robert R. Kuehn, DenyingAccess to Legal Representation: The Attack on the Tulane
Environmental Law Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 33, 51-96 (2000); David Luban, Taking Out
the Adversary: The Assault on ProgressivePublic-InterestLawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209, 220-40
(2003).
97. On narrative authority, see generally ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW
(1993); and Susan Bandes, Searchingfor Worlds Beyond the Canon: Narrative, Rhetoric, and
Legal Change, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 271, 275-76, 280-84 (2003) (book review).
98. See Susan Bryant, Collaborationin Law Practice:A Satisfying and Productive Process
for a Diverse Profession, 17 VT. L. REV. 459, 462-91 (1993) (outlining arguments for
collaboration and its effect on the profession); Lucie E. White, CollaborativeLawyering in the
Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 160 (1994)
(desctibing the author's project of "examin[ing] opportunities for collaborative lawyering work on
a local level").
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and between democratic politics and minority rights mobilization.99 Other
poverty lawyers and clinical teachers have espoused theories of
community-centered representation,' 0 0 and their endorsement comports
with liberal autonomy norms and associated dignitary interests. It is
necessary to encourage autonomy before collective determination and the
solidarity of community organizations can be achieved.' l°
The improved etticacy of grass-roots iegai-poiitical integratio
strategies hinges on lawyer understanding of community. The practical
knowledge useful to community-based campaigns comes from experiential
collaboration between lawyers and clients working jointly and locally.
Practical knowledge draws on the alternative ways of knowing, seeing, and
speaking that are accessible in subordinated communities, and it acquires
these alternative worldviews from observing the multiple problem-solving
approaches of clients participating in the lawyering process. Individual and
group participation in the process of strategic planning, remedial
negotiation, and coalition building enables lawyers to reassess the delivery
of legal services without instinctively exerting unilateral discretionary
judgments.
Experimental forms of individual and group client participation in
community-based advocacy are demonstrated in the Community Health
Rights Education (CHRE) clinic at the University of Miami School of Law.
CHRE is an interdisciplinary teaching, research, and community service
clinic providing health rights representation in public benefits (Medicaid,
KidCare, food stamps), permanency planning (guardianship), and
immigration cases to underserved communities in cooperation with the
schools of nursing and medicine. Because of the needs and demands of
clients, CHRE clinical students and faculty recently developed self-help
tenant rights workshops for clients attending university-based medical
outpatient clinics as well as for elementary school sites served by the
pediatric mobile clinic. By combining multiservice forms of medical-legal
99. This account builds on my earlier treatment of community-based poverty lawyering. See
Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567 (1993); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Speaking out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V., 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619 (1991); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1233 (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, PracticingCommunity,
107 HARv. L. REV. 1747 (1994) (book review).
100. See GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 11-82 (1992) (describing the dominant public-interest-lawyering
model and advocating alternatives); Shin Imai, A Counter-Pedagogyfor Social Justice: Core
Skills for Community-Based Lawyering, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 195, 201-25 (2002) (arguing that
concepts of community should be integrated with the pedagogy of lawyering); Daniel S. Shah,
Lawyeringfor Empowerment: Community Development and Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV.
217 (1999) (advocating "lay lawyering").
101. On autonomy in group representation, see Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness
Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers'
Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1992).
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advocacy in individual and group cross-disciplinary contexts, clinical
students and faculty have begun to bridge the boundaries of knowledge and
problem solving that traditionally divide poverty lawyers and impoverished
clients.
The transformations of role, function, and competence in communitycentered representation repudiate the heroic tradition of poverty lawyers
enmeshed in the conventional pre-understanding of legal rights advocacy.
Because participation amplifies client voices and engages legal-political
discourse, it enlarges mutual understanding and builds solidarity. The
commonality of indigent political, legal, and socioeconomic statuses
encourages alliances around community protests and electoral campaigns.
The merging of protest and campaign tactics into standard direct-service
and law reform litigation strategies marks the democratic renewal of
community-centered representation. This renewal shifts the focus of
litigation strategies from rights-based protection to rights-promoting
organization. This tactical swing toward mobilizing the independent
formation of subordinate client groups lays the groundwork for leadership
development and political empowerment.
Mobilization against racially motivated political repression promises
neither plural tolerance nor interracial conciliation, but it does foster
collaboration and dialogue. Collaboration permits clients to use their own
experiences to inform the representation process and empowers clientcentered and community-centered advocacy. Dialogue enables clients to
burnish liberal notions of autonomy, duty, and deliberation with the
creates a feminist ethic
feminist gloss of agency, trust, and reciprocity. This
10 2
coalescence.
and
formation
group
to
vital
care
of
Both the clinical and the defender literatures register increasing calls
for a community-centered advocacy process in crime-infected
neighborhoods. 10 3 Close reading of that literature documents the growing°4
effectiveness of numerous local community defender programs.
Nonetheless, community defender roles and strategies struggle to remedy
neighborhood crime and to resolve neighborhood conflict. This struggle is
displayed in the Community Economic Development and Design (CEDAD)
102. For a discussion of the unique contributions of female lawyers, see Naomi R. Calm,
Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1992). For an analysis of the importance of critical
feminist theory, see Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist CriticalTheories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990).
103. This account extends my earlier treatment of community-based practices in the criminal
justice system. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1465 (2002);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REV. 809

(2000).
104. See Cait Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Community: Expanding the
Conceptual and InstitutionalBoundaries of Providing Counsel to the Poor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 401 (2001); Kim Taylor-Thompson, IndividualActor v. InstitutionalPlayer: Alternating
Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419 (1996).
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clinic at the University of Miami School of Law. CEDAD is a communitybased education and technical assistance clinic furnishing economic
development and self-help advocacy training to residents of low-income
neighborhoods in collaboration with the school of architecture. The clinic
provides rights education workshops for low-income homeowners, tenant
groups, and neighborhood associations on fair housing, land trusts, and
predatory lending. It also assists in self-help advocacy training related to
community reinvestment, municipal equity, and public safety.
Despite the widespread emergence of community-based public safety
programs around the nation, a crime-fighting initiative spearheaded by the
Miami-Dade County and City of Miami police departments to combat
suspected drug dealing among young black male residents recently
embroiled CEDAD's clinical students and low-income communities in
controversy over both lawyer-client roles and crime-control strategies. The
ongoing controversy stemmed from the selective, race-based enforcement
of a county public safety ordinance regulating the operation and
impounding of bicycles. Typically, police officers on patrol targeted young
black males, stopping them on roadways, searching their belongings, and
seizing their bicycles. This apparent racial profiling was alternately praised
and condemned by community residents. Proponents lauded the benefits of
enhanced public safety, particularly in relation to children and schools.
Opponents assailed the costs of civil rights incursions, especially in
stigmatizing young black males. Erupting at community meetings and on
street corners, the controversy stymied remedial efforts by clinical students
unsure of their appropriate roles in mediating racially charged community
conflicts.
Because of the uncertainty of racial motive and the ambiguity of racial
outcome in CEDAD's public-safety-inspired organizing efforts around the
bicycle ordinance, our clinical students have struggled to counsel affected
individuals, their families, and their neighbors. Their struggle involves the
search for both efficacy and neutrality. Driven by that search, they seek
racial objectivity but discover their own bias. They strive for competence in
community-oriented counseling but find their advisory role elusive. They
aspire to institutional fidelity but find their loyalties to client, community,
and law divided. Although confounded by their roles and relationships to
client and community, CEDAD's clinical students openly reject the
discriminatory logic of color-blind classifications and color-coded
stereotypes. Their candor admits to the limits of lawyer understanding and
power in community advocacy.
Community-centered
theories
of representation
reject
this
discriminatory logic because of the expressive harm of stigma. Instead,
these theories proffer a sweeping community ethic that binds racial groups
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together in a dignity-based social contract of mutual respect. Such an ethic
also respects the racial dignity of the accused, as well as the victim, and
honors the integrity of racial community. Deliberative democracy relies on
dialogue, pluralism, and reciprocity to mediate client-community and
community-state conflicts. The mediated exchange of reciprocal dialogue
restores community bonds. 105
In contrast, the color-blind rhetoric of community-centered
representation summoned in defense of racially motivated violence splinters
collective bonds. Compelled by the neutral objectivity of the adversary
function, the rhetoric invokes a profoundly contested vision of racial
identity and community. Departing from that rhetoric demands renewed
emphasis on citizen participation, institutional decentralization, and local
accountability in the defender function. Participation in decentralized
defender institutions responsive to citizen collaboration and equality
initiatives revises defender roles.
The redefinition of role and function enables defenders to grasp the
contingency of racial identity, the multiplicity of racial narrative, and the
stigma of racial stereotype. Racial identity is contingent on the cultural and
social location of the defendant. Racial narrative is fueled by this location
and its diversity. Racial stereotype involves public stigma confronted on the
street, in school, and out in the marketplace. Grasping these historical
continuities allows the use of the criminal justice system as a public forum
for racial contest over poverty, disempowerment, and segregation. Public
contest entails a collective accounting of the civic harm inflicted on
communities of color by race-tainted adversarial practices. This democratic
accounting enhances racial dignity and empowerment. Civic empowerment
promotes criminal justice reform campaigns aimed at ameliorating
inequality.
The reconfigured civic competence and function of communitycentered defenders encourage attendance at community meetings;
decentralization of neighborhood offices; coordination with faith-based
institutions and social services agencies; and participation in neighborhood
crime prevention and urban revitalization partnerships with for-profit
entities, nonprofit organizations, and governmental branches. These
collaborative practices of citizenship correspond with an antisubordination
model of democratic participation and accountability. On this account, the
community defender movement offers a democratic rights-promoting
105. See Raymond H. Brescia et al., Who's in Charge,Anyway? A Proposalfor CommunityBased Legal Services, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 848-60 (1998); Michael Diamond, Community
Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 67, 101-30 (2000);
Ann Southworth, Collective Representationfor the Disadvantaged: Variations in Problems of
Accountability, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2455-64 (1999).
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approach to neighborhood defense and reclamation intended to alleviate
poverty, powerlessness, and racial violence. This alternative citizenparticipatory approach invigorates the civic obligation of criminal defenders
to the accused and the public. It also encourages civic collaboration and
accountability in the criminal justice system, which enlarges democratic
engagement in the struggle to expand minority political and socioeconomic
equality.
Equality-compelled resistance to racial hierarchy and racist ideology in
civil and criminal justice systems informs cultural interpretation, social
struggle, and political protest. Eschewing accommodation, resistance
exploits institutional animus to unify relationships and forge common
alliances against private and public racial inequities ranging from
community economic development to neighborhood environmental
justice. 0 6 The relationships assemble the particularized narratives drawn
from individuals and communities of color into an oppositional voice of
civil rights and political reform.
The rise of transitional forms of rights organization and mobilization in
impoverished communities redistributes the labor of the lawyering process
by shifting advocacy and organizing functions to clients where plausible
and productive.10 7 Functional shifts in lawyer-client routines and
relationships open up space for the fuller expression of client identity and
narrative in advocacy. The same shifts narrow the space available for
lawyer privilege and paternalism. This cabining consigns the lawyer to a
more technical role in the advocacy process. Reducing the role of lawyer
leadership in democratic rights mobilization advances the goal of client and
community empowerment.
Weakening lawyer standing in the legal process also strengthens the
conditions for attaining client autonomy in the political process. In
impoverished communities, especially communities of color, political
autonomy arises from the transformation of community-centered campaigns
against crime and blight into wider electoral campaigns against racist and
subordinating public policies. In that transition, citizenship is realized. The
result may prove imperfect, offering a collective example of citizenship

106. See Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous
Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557 (1999); Eric K. Yamamoto & Jen-L W. Lyman,
RacializingEnvironmental Justice, 72 U. COLO. L. REv. 311 (2001).
107. See Ann Southworth, Business Planningfor the Destitute? Lawyers as Facilitatorsin
Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 1121, 1132-47; see also Steve Bachmann,

Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 21-29 (1984-1985);
Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: CriticalLegal Theory and the

Practiceof Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 395-410 (1982-1983).
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marred by poor judgment, 10 8 uncertain accountability,' 0 9 and uneven
democratic commitment.110 Nevertheless, it remains a moment of
citizenship, of demonstrated civic engagement and collective deliberation.
Ely celebrated democratic engagement, however muted and short lived.
His enduring embrace of liberalism and ongoing effort to enlarge its
egalitarian boundaries demonstrate his institutional fidelity and his
democratic commitment to minority inclusion in the political process. For
Ely, the race-conscious politics of minority inclusion and equality preserved
rather than breached the legitimacy of American constitutional democracy.
CONCLUSION

Culled from considerations of lawyer role, institutional function, and
political legitimacy, legal process traditions limit the reach of clientcentered and community-centered lawyering models. Unsurprisingly, Ely's
defense of political access and minority equality rights extended that reach,
implying antisubordination axioms of democratic empowerment and
minority collaboration. Contextually applied, the axioms offer the promise
of safeguarding the legal, political, and economic interests of unrepresented
individuals and communities.
Ely's fusion of democracy and equality in legal process bridges
constitutional theory and clinical practice to offer a worthy vision of
progressive lawyering. That vision holds significant, albeit unexplored,
consequences for clinical education and training as well as for lawyer
ethical roles and responsibilities. Under its guiding principles, client
empowerment and lawyer-client collaboration rise to prominence as much
for their transformative potential as for their democratic commitment. By
turns race conscious and civic conscious, this commitment reconceives the
nature of the lawyering process in impoverished and crime-ridden
communities. All his life, Ely spoke of that process with reverence,
defending its mission and deepening its devotion to equal justice. Even now
his voice rings out.

108. See Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the
Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and ClinicalLegal Education, 88 Nw. U. L.
REv. 695, 707-08 (1994).
109. See Southworth, supra note 105, at 2451-55.
110. See Michael Diamond & Aaron O'Toole, Leaders, Followers, and Free Riders: The
Community Lawyer's Dilemma When Representing Non-Democratic Client Organizations,
31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 481, 540-44 (2004).
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